Hall of fame
The results of the evaluation of the submitted attacks on the private database are published on this page.
Participants
This is a list of all participants for the second edition of the DPA contest. The list is sorted by submission date.
- Thanh-Ha LE (MORPHO, France): 2 attacks
- Maël BERTHIER (MORPHO, France): 1 attack
- Alexis BONNECAZE (IML, ERISCS, France): 6 attacks
- Jeremy ABIHSSIRA & Celine THUILLET (EADS Defence & Security, France): 1 attack
- Daisuke NAKATSU (University of Electro-Communications, Japan): 1 attack
- Antoine WURCKER (UNILIM, Faculte des Sciences et Techniques de Limoges, France): 2 attacks
- Edgar MATEOS (University of Waterloo, Canada): 1 attack
- Matthieu WALLE (Thales Communications, France): 4 attacks
For the second submission period:
- Olivier MEYNARD (Télécom ParisTech, France): 3 attacks
- Shiqian WANG (Morpho, France): 1 attack
- Maël BERTHIER (MORPHO, France): 4 attacks
- Victor LOMNÉ (ANSSI, France): 1 attack
- Aziz EL AABID (Télécom ParisTech, France): 1 attack
After the end of the contest:
- Annelie HEUSER, Michael KASPER, Werner SCHINDLER, Marc STÖTTINGER (CASED (research group CASCADE), TU Darmstadt, Fraunhofer SIT, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Germany): 2 attacks
- Yang LI, Daisuke NAKATSU, Kazuo SAKIYAMA (University of Electro-Communications, Japan): 1 attack
- Benoît GÉRARD, Nicolas VEYRAT-CHARVILLON (Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium): 3 attacks
- Suvadeep HAJRA, Debdeep MUKHOPADHYAY (Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur, India): 3 attacks
- Lirong LIU (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States of America): 1 attack
- Yongbin Zhou, Hui Zhao, Lin Meng (Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China): 1 attack
Results
A first version of the temporary results is available from the slides presented at the rump-session of CHES'2010: Slideshow.
The final results were presented at COSADE 2011 during the DPA contest special session (slideshow).
Ranking
GSR stable above 80%
First submission period
- Matthieu WALLE (Thales Communications), attack 7T: 7,061 (+ his 3 other attacks)
- Maël BERTHIER (MORPHO), attack CPA: 15,943
- Alexis BONNECAZE (IML, ERISCS), attack SPE: 18,458
First & second submission period
- Matthieu WALLE (Thales Communications), attack 7T: 7,061 (+ his 3 other attacks)
- Victor LOMNÉ (ANSSI), attack Recursive CPA: 10,666
- Maël BERTHIER & Yves BOCKTAELS (MORPHO), attack CPA AP SBOX PRD2: 10,796
All time (including after the end of the contest)
- Benoît GÉRARD, Nicolas VEYRAT-CHARVILLON (Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium): 439 (template attack) (+ 2 other attack)
- Yang LI, Daisuke NAKATSU, Kazuo SAKIYAMA (University of Electro-Communications, Japan): 2,256
- Annelie HEUSER, Michael KASPER, Werner SCHINDLER, Marc STÖTTINGER (CASED (research group CASCADE); TU Darmstadt, Fraunhofer SIT, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)), Stochastic attack (stochastic approach): 3,589 (+ 1 other attack)
- Matthieu WALLE (Thales Communications), attack 7T: 7,061 (+ his 3 other attacks)
Min PSR stable above 80%
First submission period
- Matthieu WALLE (Thales Communications), attack 9T: 5,890 (+ his 3 other attacks)
- Alexis BONNECAZE (IML, ERISCS), attack SPE: 12,318
- Antoine WURCKER (UNILIM), attack A: 12,631
First & second submission period
- Matthieu WALLE (Thales Communications), attack 9T: 5,890 (+ his 3 other attacks)
- Maël BERTHIER & Yves BOCKTAELS (MORPHO), attack CPA AP SBOX PRD2: 7,510 (+ 1 of their other attacks)
- Olivier MEYNARD (Télécom ParisTech), attack A5: 8,835
All time (including after the end of the contest)
- Benoît GÉRARD, Nicolas VEYRAT-CHARVILLON (Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium): 439 (template attack) (+ 2 other attack)
- Yang LI, Daisuke NAKATSU, Kazuo SAKIYAMA (University of Electro-Communications, Japan): 2,155
- Annelie HEUSER, Michael KASPER, Werner SCHINDLER, Marc STÖTTINGER (CASED (research group CASCADE); TU Darmstadt, Fraunhofer SIT, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)), Stochastic attack (stochastic approach): 2,748 (+1 other attack)
- Matthieu WALLE (Thales Communications), attack 9T: 5,890 (+ his 3 other attacks)
Max PGE stable below 10
First submission period
- Matthieu WALLE (Thales Communications), attack 7T: 3,388 (+ his 3 other attacks)
- Antoine WURCKER (UNILIM), attack A: 4,192 (+ his other attack)
- Maël BERTHIER (MORPHO), attack CPA: 4,706
First & second submission period
- Maël BERTHIER & Yves BOCKTAELS (MORPHO), attack CPA AP SBOX: 2,767 (+ 1 of their other attacks)
- Matthieu WALLE (Thales Communications), attack 7T: 3,388 (+ his 3 other attacks)
- Antoine WURCKER (UNILIM), attack A: 4,192 (+ his other attack)
All time (including after the end of the contest)
- Benoît GÉRARD, Nicolas VEYRAT-CHARVILLON (Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium): 479 (template attack) (+ 2 other attack)
- Annelie HEUSER, Michael KASPER, Werner SCHINDLER, Marc STÖTTINGER (CASED (research group CASCADE); TU Darmstadt, Fraunhofer SIT, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)), Stochastic attack (stochastic approach): 1,356 (+1 other attack)
- Maël BERTHIER & Yves BOCKTAELS (MORPHO), attack CPA AP SBOX: 2,767 (+ 1 of their other attacks)
- Yang LI, Daisuke NAKATSU, Kazuo SAKIYAMA (University of Electro-Communications, Japan): 3,181
Details
| Attack | GSR > 80% | Min PSR > 80% | Max PGE < 10 | GSR stable > 80% | Min PSR stable > 80% | Max PGE stable < 10 | GSR @20k | Min PSR @20k | Max PSR @20k | Min PGE @20k | Max PGE @20k | Time/Trace |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reference Attack Sylvain Guilley Télécom ParisTech Full report (PDF) |
F | 13,876 | F | F | 15,316 | F | 0.53 | 0.81 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 40.25 | 1.10 s |
| Template Attack Aziz El Aabid Télécom ParisTech Full report (PDF) |
F | F | F | F | F | F | 0.19 | 0.35 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 37.84 | 0.05 s |
| Alexis Bonnecaze IML, ERISCS Attack DPA Full report (PDF) |
F | F | 9,561 | F | F | 9,629 | 0.41 | 0.75 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.72 | < 0.01 s |
| Alexis Bonnecaze IML, ERISCS Attack SPE Full report (PDF) |
17,340 | 11,818 | 5,908 | 18,458 | 12,318 | 6,262 | 0.88 | 0.94 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.06 | 0.83 s |
| Alexis Bonnecaze IML, ERISCS Attack VAR Full report (PDF) |
F | F | 18,938 | F | F | 19,631 | 0.53 | 0.69 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 9.16 | < 0.01 s |
| Alexis Bonnecaze IML, ERISCS Attack VDPA Full report (PDF) |
F | F | 15,191 | F | F | 17,646 | 0.25 | 0.53 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 5.22 | < 0.01 s |
| Alexis Bonnecaze IML, ERISCS Attack CVM Full report (PDF) |
F | F | 15,516 | F | F | 17,526 | 0.44 | 0.69 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 6.56 | 0.31 s |
| Antoine Wurcker UNILIM: Faculte des Sciences et Techniques de Limoges Attack A Full report (PDF) |
13,474 | 11,501 | 4,179 | 19,858 | 12,631 | 4,192 | 0.81 | 0.88 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.16 | 0.25 s |
| Antoine Wurcker UNILIM: Faculte des Sciences et Techniques de Limoges Attack B Full report (PDF) |
F | 11,525 | 4,179 | F | 12,866 | 4,192 | 0.69 | 0.88 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.16 | 0.25 s |
| Edgar Mateos Electrical and Computer Engineering Department University of Waterloo - Canada Full report (PDF) |
F | F | 5,994 | F | F | 5,994 | 0.59 | 0.78 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 3.41 | < 0.01 s |
| Matthieu Walle Thales Communications Attack 7F Full report (PDF) |
8,563 | 5,546 | 3,388 | 9,384 | 6,046 | 3,388 | 0.94 | 0.94 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.09 | 0.07 s |
| Matthieu Walle Thales Communications Attack 7T Full report (PDF) |
6,704 | 5,408 | 3,388 | 7,061 | 6,028 | 3,388 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.03 s |
| Matthieu Walle Thales Communications Attack 9F Full report (PDF) |
8,567 | 5,957 | 3,404 | 9,479 | 7,449 | 3,442 | 0.94 | 0.94 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.09 | 0.07 s |
| Matthieu Walle Thales Communications Attack 9T Full report (PDF) |
7,094 | 5,827 | 3,404 | 7,367 | 5,890 | 3,442 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.04 s |
| Maël Berthier MORPHO Attack CPA Full report (PDF) |
15,071 | 9,630 | 4,088 | 15,943 | 12,800 | 4,706 | 0.88 | 0.94 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.06 | 4.52 s |
| Thanh-Ha Le MORPHO Attack MI cumulant 4th order Full report (PDF) |
F | 12,148 | 7,475 | F | 19,969 | 9,266 | 0.68 | 0.82 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.74 | 8.77 s |
| Thanh-Ha Le MORPHO Attack MI cumulant Full report (PDF) |
15,764 | 11,368 | 6,828 | 18,730 | 13,205 | 7,444 | 0.88 | 0.91 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.44 | 7.24 s |
Second submission period
| Attack | GSR > 80% | Min PSR > 80% | Max PGE < 10 | GSR stable > 80% | Min PSR stable > 80% | Max PGE stable < 10 | GSR @20k | Min PSR @20k | Max PSR @20k | Min PGE @20k | Max PGE @20k | Time/Trace |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Olivier Meynard Télécom ParisTech Frequency domain (2nd attack) Full report (PDF) |
F | F | 13,161 | F | F | 15,421 | 0.53 | 0.72 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 3.53 | 0.14 s |
| Victor Lomné ANSSI Recursive CPA Full report (PDF) |
10,666 | 9,492 | 4,840 | 10,666 | 9,492 | 6,053 | 0.97 | 0.97 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.09 | 0.13 s |
| Olivier Meynard Télécom ParisTech Correlation product Full report (PDF) |
F | F | 7,213 | F | F | 10,438 | 0.53 | 0.78 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 2.06 | < 0.01 s |
| Shiqian Wang MORPHO Attack S1 Full report (PDF) |
F | 15,900 | 10,200 | F | 16,500 | 11,400 | 0.72 | 0.91 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.19 | 2.71 s |
| Maël Berthier, Yves Bocktaels MORPHO Attack CPA AP Full report (PDF) |
15,490 | 10,738 | 4,962 | 17,941 | 11,607 | 4,995 | 0.88 | 0.94 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.06 | 4.43 s |
| Olivier Meynard Télécom ParisTech Correlation product Full report (PDF) |
15,421 | 8,164 | 4,614 | 17,932 | 13,186 | 6,975 | 0.91 | 0.94 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.41 | < 0.01 s |
| Maël Berthier, Yves Bocktaels MORPHO Attack CPA AP SBOX Full report (PDF) |
10,739 | 6,944 | 2,674 | 11,458 | 7,986 | 2,767 | 0.97 | 0.97 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.03 | 8.59 s |
| Maël Berthier, Yves Bocktaels MORPHO Attack CPA AP SBOX PRD Full report (PDF) |
10,453 | 8,672 | 7,413 | 11,520 | 10,000 | 7,489 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 5.78 s |
| Maël Berthier, Yves Bocktaels MORPHO Attack CPA AP SBOX PRD2 Full report (PDF) |
10,213 | 6,944 | 2,840 | 10,796 | 7,510 | 2,922 | 0.97 | 0.97 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.03 | 5.24 s |
| Olivier Meynard Télécom ParisTech Correlation product v3 Full report (PDF) |
10,772 | 7,426 | 4,439 | 12,877 | 8,835 | 5,451 | 0.94 | 0.97 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.19 | < 0.01 s |
| Template Attack v2 Aziz El Aabid Télécom ParisTech Full report (PDF) |
F | F | F | F | F | F | 0.59 | 0.66 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 27.59 | 0.05 s |
After second submission period
| Attack | GSR > 80% | Min PSR > 80% | Max PGE < 10 | GSR stable > 80% | Min PSR stable > 80% | Max PGE stable < 10 | GSR @20k | Min PSR @20k | Max PSR @20k | Min PGE @20k | Max PGE @20k | Time/Trace |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Annelie Heuser, Michael Kasper, Werner Schindler, Marc Stöttinger CASED (research group CASCADE); TU Darmstadt, Fraunhofer SIT, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Germany Stochastic attack (stochastic approach) Full report (PDF) |
5,571 | 4,358 | 1,894 | 6,729 | 4,358 | 1,894 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.36 s |
|
Annelie Heuser, Michael Kasper, Werner Schindler, Marc Stöttinger CASED (research group CASCADE); TU Darmstadt, Fraunhofer SIT, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Germany Stochastic attack (stochastic approach) v2 Full report (PDF) |
3,589 | 2,683 | 1,356 | 3,589 | 2,748 | 1,356 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.52 s |
|
Yang Li, Daisuke Nakatsu, Kazuo Sakiyama University of Electro-Communications Full report (PDF) |
2,256 | 2,155 | 3,181 | 2,256 | 2,155 | 3,181 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.44 s |
| Benoît GÉRARD, Nicolas VEYRAT-CHARVILLON Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium Template attack Full report (PDF) |
1,173 | 1,173 | 1,268 | 1,173 | 1,173 | 1,268 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | < 0.01 s |
| Benoît GÉRARD, Nicolas VEYRAT-CHARVILLON Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium Template attack Full report (PDF) |
509 | 509 | 509 | 509 | 509 | 509 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | < 0.01 s |
| Benoît GÉRARD, Nicolas VEYRAT-CHARVILLON Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium Template attack Full report (PDF) |
439 | 439 | 479 | 439 | 439 | 479 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.34 s |
| Suvadeep HAJRA, Debdeep MUKHOPADHYAY Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur, India VoC Full report (PDF) |
16,242 | 9,772 | 3,209 | 19,470 | 13,914 | 3,255 | 0.84 | 0.91 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.50 | 0.25 s |
| Suvadeep HAJRA, Debdeep MUKHOPADHYAY Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur, India VoV Full report (PDF) |
17,102 | 13,208 | 3,258 | 19,935 | 16,305 | 3,442 | 0.81 | 0.91 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.47 | 0.02 s |
| Suvadeep HAJRA, Debdeep MUKHOPADHYAY Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur, India VoC exhaust Full report (PDF) |
7,119 | 6,179 | 3,209 | 7,119 | 6,179 | 3,255 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.08 s |
| Lirong Liu Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States of America Full report (PDF) |
F | F | 14,872 | F | F | 19,858 | 0.00 | 0.38 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 9.50 | 0.03 s |
| Yongbin Zhou, Hui Zhao, Lin Meng Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China This attack has been evaluated with only 1 key and 7,500 traces |
5,978 | 5,978 | 3,548 | DNF | DNF | 5,041 | DNF | DNF | DNF | DNF | DNF | 600 s |
Key
- GSR > 80%: Number of traces for the Global Success Rate to be above 80% (F: the attack failed to reach this rate with 20,000 traces)
- Min PSR > 80%: Number of traces for the minimum Partial Success Rate to be above 80% (F: the attack failed to reach this rate with 20,000 traces)
- Max PGE < 10: Number of traces for the maximum Partial Guessing Entropy to be below 10 (F: the attack failed to reach this rate with 20,000 traces)
- GSR stable > 80%: Number of traces for the Global Success Rate to be stable above 80% (F: the attack failed to reach this rate with 20,000 traces)
- Min PSR stable > 80%: Number of traces for the minimum Partial Success Rate to be stable above 80% (F: the attack failed to reach this rate with 20,000 traces)
- Max PGE stable < 10: Number of traces for the maximum Partial Guessing Entropy to be stable below 10 (F: the attack failed to reach this rate with 20,000 traces)
- GSR @20k: Global Success Rate after 20,000 traces
- Min PSR @20k: Minimum Partial Success Rate after 20,000 traces
- Max PSR @20k: Maximum Partial Success Rate after 20,000 traces
- Min PGE @20k: Minimum Partial Guessing Entropy after 20,000 traces
- Max PGE @20k: Maximum Partial Guessing Entropy after 20,000 traces
- Time/Trace: Mean time per trace
- DNF: We were not been able to fully evaluate the attack on 20,000 traces (mainly due to the slowness of the attack)
Previous edition
The hall of fame for the first edition (2008-2009) of the DPA contest is still available on the Hall of Fame (v1) page.