Rules of the Contest
The goal of the contest is to write the best attack algorithm on a given set of power consumption traces. The different implementations will be compared against each others. The ranking will be published on the Hall of Fame part of the web site.Comparison Criterion
In order to build an objective ranking of the algorithms being committed by the hardware security community, we have to specify on which criterion will be evaluated these algorithms. The only criterion that we consider relevant is the unique traces count needed to guess the key. If for instance one trace is fetched twice from the database, then it counts for only one single access. The traces come with some meta-information, such as the corresponding plaintext, key and cryptogram; all this supplemental information can be used, apart from the key, of course.
In addition, the key guess has to be stable.
This means that we expect the algorithm to continuously keep its correct key when continuing to accumulate more traces.
We arbitrarily fixed a threshold at 100 iterations with the good key.
So, if the algorithm finds the good key, and keep it for at least 100 iterations, we consider that
it has definitely found the key, and that it won't change its mind.
Thus, the traces count needed to find the key including the 100 stable iterations is the mark we'll give to an algorithm.
To be completely sure that your algorithm has converged on the correct key,
we recommend that you check that the key guess remains stable while exhausting all the 81k+ traces from the secmatv1_2006_04_0809 acquisition campaign.
Although a so-called `brute force' search would be possible (by checking out only one or a few couple of traces), we expect the players to be fair :-) For sure, an exhaustive key search could indeed by run on special purpose cryptanalytic hardware/software, such as:
- the `DES cracker', designed by the EFF (Refer to the book Cracking DES by O'reilly, ISBN 13: 9781565925205), or
- the `COPACOBANA', designed jointly by the Ruhr University of Bochum and the Christian-Albrechts University Kiel, or
- the `distributed.net' software running on idle PCs connected over the internet.
- 6 x 8 = 48 bits of the key, corresponding to the first round sub-key, are retrieved by a side-channel analysis, while
- the remaining 8 bits are searched exhaustively.
Evolution of the DPA contest rules
As discussed in this article by the UCL (F.-X. Standaert et al. in IACR eprint # 2008/517), the rules of the DPA contest should evolve to better take into account the necessary statistical evaluation of successful attacks.We are, of course, open to any other suggestion regarding the contest rules. The abovementioned evolution proposal is really sound (it has been scrutinized by many peer reviewers), and will therefore be enforced as soon as next year.
As for this 2008-2009 year, a debriefing about evaluation metrics suitable for side-channel attacks will be conducted at Lausanne during http://www.chesworkshop.org/ 2009.